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Abstract
Organizational ambidexterity is a burgeoning field of research, but the
boundary conditions of organizational ambidexterity are yet to be fully
understood. This paper advances the growing literature with ten
propositions on the boundary conditions of organizational ambidexterity.
Those boundary conditions include an organization’s degree of market
orientation, environmental turbulence, organizational size, organizational
slack, risk tolerance, organizational age, and the degree of
institutionalization. We also discuss our findings’ implications for future
research agendas on organizational ambidexterity.
I. Introduction
Research on organizational ambidexterity is burgeoning. Defined as an
organizational capability to simultaneously exploit internal knowledge and explore
external knowledge (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2007; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008),
organizational ambidexterity is thought to be a particularly important organizational
competence in an increasingly turbulent modern competitive environment.1) One
example is O’Reilly & Tushman (2007), who propose closely relating organizational
ambidexterity to dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), that is, “the
firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences
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1 ) The literature still has not made clear whether organizational ambidexterity is an organizational
capability (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2007; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008) or simply a state in which
an organization simultaneously exploits and explores (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda,
2005 b). We adopt the former perspective in accordance with a recent theoretical development
that emphasizes organizational ambidexterity as being closely related to dynamic capabilities.
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to address rapidly changing environments (p.516).”2) Weigelt & Sarkar (2011) also
propose an intricate relationship between organizational ambidexterity and
absorptive capacity by arguing that organizational ambidexterity is realized by a
firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), a unique branch of dynamic
capabilities (Jansen, Van Den Bosch & Volberda, 2005 a; Zahra & George, 2002).
Raisch & Birkinshaw (2008) even state “the ability to achieve ambidexterity has
been said to lie at the heart of a firm’s dynamic capabilities” (p.393),3) indicating
organizational ambidexterity is an equivalent of dynamic capabilities.
Since a seminal article by Duncan (1976) that first proposed the concept of
organizational ambidexterity, many scholars have studied organizational
ambidexterity (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He
& Wong, 2004; Kane & Alavi, 2007; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lubatkin, Simsek,
Ling, & Veiga, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2007; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008;
Sheremata, 2000; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Suzuki & Methé, 2011; Tushman
& O’Reilly, 1996; Tushman, Anderson, & O’Reilly, 1997; Wang & Li, 2008;
Weigelt & Sarkar, 2011). To date, however, most extant research focuses on either
identifying antecedents of organizational ambidexterity, or empirically testing the
beneficial effects of organizational ambidexterity. On the other hand, the boundary
conditions of organizational ambidexterity have remained relatively underexplored
(Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).4) In this manuscript, we try to uncover contingencies
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2 ) The close association between organizational ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities is
intuitively compelling, but their precise relationship is rather unclear. For example, O’Reilly &
Tushman (2007) imply three distinct possibilities as follows: 1) organizational ambidexterity is a
manifestation of a firm’s dynamic capabilities (“a set of propositions that suggest how
ambidexterity acts as a dynamic capability” (p.2), or “dynamic capabilities are at the heart of
the ability of a business to be ambidextrous” (p.12)); 2) dynamic capabilities are antecedents of
organizational ambidexterity (“actions, behaviors, and design choices comprise the dynamic
capabilities that enable firms to simultaneously explore and exploit” (p.31)); and 3)
organizational ambidexterity is an antecedent of dynamic capabilities (“this capability, to both
explore and exploit, helps organizations to reconfigure existing assets and capabilities to sense
and seize new opportunities” (p.40)). An important future research agenda will be to specify the
relationship between organizational ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities, if any.
3 ) This is one example of the confused usages of the term, “organizational ambidexterity.” Since
Raisch & Birkinshaw (2008) define organizational ambidexterity as an “organization’s ability to
be aligned and efficient in its management of today’s business demands while simultaneously
being adaptive to changes in the environment” (p.375), “the ability to achieve ambidexterity”
(p.393) should be a higher order organizational capability that enables lower order
organizational capability (in this case, organizational ambidexterity), if it does exist.
4 ) Another relatively underexplored field of ambidexterity research is the optimal balance between
exploitation and exploration. By showing a negative association between firm performance
(sales growth rate) and the relative imbalance between exploitative and explorative innovation
strategies, He & Wong (2004) implicitly suggest that equal resource allocation between  
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under which managers can effectively leverage organizational ambidexterity for their
organization’s “system survival and prosperity” (March, 1991, p.71).
II. Organizational Ambidexterity
Organizational ambidexterity is an organizational capability to exploit internal
knowledge while simultaneously exploring external knowledge (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2007; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Recent advances in our understanding
of ambidextrous organizations (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Gibson &
Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lubatkin, Simsek,
Ling, & Veiga, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2007; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008;
Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Suzuki & Methé, 2011; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996;
Tushman, Anderson, & O’Reilly, 1997; Wang & Li, 2008; Weigelt & Sarkar, 2011)
show organizations are capable (or incapable) of simultaneously exploiting and
exploring to varying degrees. Some organizations skillfully exploit and explore at
the same time, whereas other organizations find it difficult to do so.
Exploitation is usually related to improvements, increased efficiency, and
incremental adjustments, whereas exploration is closely linked with variety
generation, distinctly new possibilities, distant search, and radical or revolutionary
change (March, 1991). For example, in the context of technological innovation, the
distinction between exploitation and exploration is made by considering whether the
locus of organizational learning is on reusing existing knowledge and technology, or
on pursuing new knowledge and technology. Accordingly, scholars operationalize
exploitation and exploration with such polarized comparisons as pharmaceutical
products based on an existing chemical entity and the ones based on a new chemical
entity (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Cardinal, 2001; Dunlap-Hinkler, Kotabe, &
Mudambi, 2010; Suzuki & Methé, 2011), self-citing patents and non self-citing
patents (Benner & Tushman, 2002; So/ rensen & Stuart, 2000), refinements of a
CISC architecture microprocessor and a shift to a RISC architecture microprocessor
??????????????????????????????????????????
  exploitation and exploration is the optimal. Wang & Li (2008) argue that deviation from the
expected amount of exploration hurts firm performance, implying “the optimal search behavior”
predicted from the focal firm’s aspiration discrepancy, organizational slack, financial distress,
technological scope, levels of competition, and environmental dynamism decides the firm-unique
degree of organizational ambidexterity. He & Wong (2004) admit their assumption is rather
naïve when they point out that future research should uncover “how the optimal balance
between exploration and exploitation may be contingent on such environmental factors” (p.493)
including market and technological dynamism. Wang & Li (2008) ignore the fact that the
amount of exploitation may be decided independently from the optimal exploration behavior,
and thus firm-level optimal balance differs from the one predicted by considering only
exploration.
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(Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2003), or repetition or refinement of a hard disk drive
manufacturer’s existing form factors (different-sized disks) and development of new
form factors (Piao, 2010).
Empirical proofs show organizational ambidexterity is indeed beneficial for
firm performance. He & Wong (2004) show that Singaporean and Malaysian
manufacturing firms adopting both exploitative and explorative innovation strategy
achieved higher sales growth rates than their competitors that are characterized by
either exploitative innovation strategy or explorative innovation strategy. Wang & Li
(2008) show both overexploitation and overexploration, defined as the degree of
deviation from the expected amount of exploration, is negatively associated with
sample U.S. firms’ innovation performance as measured by a citation-based patent
count. They also found a similar negative association between overexploitation (and
overexploration) and financial performance (Tobin’s q). Piao (2010) studied the
hard disk drive industry between 1980 and 1999 to show that a moderate degree of
temporal overlap between an exploitative product development process and an
exploratory product development process is associated with firm longevity.
Then, how can organizations pursue these seemingly distinct initiatives (i.e.,
exploiting existing knowledge and exploring new knowledge) at the same time?
According to prior works, organizations can be ambidextrous through such levers as
managerial interventions (Tushman, Anderson, & O’Reilly, 1997), unique
organizational contexts (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), or top management teams’
behavioral integration (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006) in that they can
exploit, as well as explore at the same time (Suzuki & Methé, 2011).
One of the most familiar recommendations on how to reconcile exploitation
and exploration is structural separation (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Cooper &
Smith, 1992; Gilbert, 2005). Because exploitation and exploration cannot be
simultaneously pursued in the same organization, it is suggested that organizational
units geared toward each of these activities should be separated. With such
reasoning, these scholars argue that it is necessary to establish distinct organizational
units with different orientations, i.e., one for exploitation (in most cases, an existing
organizational unit), and another for exploration (again, in most cases a new
organizational unit). This argument has received considerable empirical support
(Afuah, 2001; Burgelman, 1983; McGrath, 2001; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006;
Rosenbloom & Christensen, 1994).
In case separating an organization is too difficult, exploitative and exploratory
tasks can be assigned to different parts of an organization in a slightly modified
manner. One example is to divide the responsibilities among hierarchical levels.
Specifically, one can expect exploration from the operating levels where managers
and front-line employees experiment with novel solutions to emerging problems,
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while the responsibility to exploit promising solutions is assigned to the top-
management who select and leverage middle managers’ exploitative initiatives
(Burgelman, 1983; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003).
Another approach to address the trade-off relationship between exploitation and
exploration is to separate them temporally. One of the most well-known examples is
an organizational application of evolutionary pattern called punctuated equilibrium
(Eldredge & Gould, 1972; Gersick, 1991; Tushman, Anderson, & O’Reilly, 1997;
Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Seen from
the punctuated equilibrium perspective, organizations are described as cyclically
going through a period of convergence and a period of upheaval. The period of
convergence is characterized by incremental improvements on knowledge,
technology, or organizational processes. The period of convergence is also
associated with increasingly tighter coupling among decisions, actions, and
organizational structures (Siggelkow, 2001). Whereas the essence of this period is
continuity, it is suddenly punctuated with episodic upheavals, or drastic
reorientations (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). The period of upheaval is full of
drastic changes based on unknown fields of knowledge. Everything, including
strategy, control systems, and the distribution of power is redefined. This
redefinition undermines existing rules, standards, and structures. Since the
magnitude of substantial changes is traumatic to organizational members, managers’
heroic interventions are required to push through the necessary disruptive changes
during the period of upheaval.
While these arguments focus on how to divide tasks associated with
exploitation and exploration either structurally or temporally, proponents for
contextual ambidexterity argue that organizations can be ambidextrous not by
separating exploitation and exploration, but by creating a unique organizational
context supportive of both (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Defined as “the behavioral
capacity to simultaneously demonstrate alignment and adaptability across an entire
business unit” (ibid., p.209), people with contextual ambidexterity are enabled, as
well as forced to be ambidextrous. More specifically, under an organizational
context characterized by a combination of stretch goals, discipline, managerial
support and trust, organizational members exploit and explore at the same time. The
challenges of simultaneously pursuing exploitation and exploration cannot be fully
attenuated even by contextual ambidexterity. However, this unique organizational
context empowers organizational members so they can strive for an ambidextrous
organization more vigorously, by reducing concerns about the risks of failure in
meeting stretch goals.
Some other scholars argue that a specific behavioral pattern called behavioral
integration among a top management team is an influential determinant of the
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degree of organizational ambidexterity (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006).
Behavioral integration is characterized by rich and frequent information exchanges,
a focus on joint decision making, and collaborative behaviors among a top
management team. Such behaviors nourish increased degrees of wholeness and unity
of efforts among executives, which are instrumental in effectively synchronizing
contradictory knowledge processes associated with exploitation and exploration.
Similarly, since executives’ behavioral pattern is strongly influenced by their
background, some other scholars argue a founding team’s prior company affiliation
can be another antecedent of organizational ambidexterity (Beckman, 2006).
Founding teams characterized by a mixture of common and diverse company
affiliations pursue exploitation and exploration more effectively than do other teams
composed of mostly common company affiliations, or diverse company affiliations
(ibid.).
The extant works reviewed above indicate that organizational ambidexterity is
not easy to achieve. Executives, as well as organizational members, need to manage
carefully their daily behaviors so that their organization is ambidextrous. In other
words, organizational ambidexterity is costly. For example, separating an
organization into independent units requires significant amounts of time and effort.
In addition, managing those separated units in a manner that achieves synergistic
effects demands more exertion by the managers involved. As for temporal
ambidexterity, executives are periodically required to expend great efforts on
drastically changing organizational strategy, technology, and routines while
overcoming substantial resistance and reluctance on the part of managers, front-line
employees, and various external stakeholders. At organizations characterized by
contextual ambidexterity, the life of employees can be cognitively confusing in that
they are trusted at the same time as they are disciplined. Likewise, a behaviorally
integrated top management team calls for frequent information sharing and joint
decision making among executives, which can be very stressful for already busy
executives.
Given that organizational ambidexterity is so costly to achieve, managers need
to be selective when they decide whether their organization should pursue
organizational ambidexterity. Although scholars empirically report the beneficial
effects of organizational ambidexterity (He & Wong, 2004; Piao, 2010, Wang & Li,
2008), their findings’ external validity may be limited since their study is bounded
by the authors’ choice of sample firms and time periods. There may be some
circumstances where the benefits of organizational ambidexterity are outweighed by
its costs. We try to address this question below.
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III. Key Assumptions underlying Benefits of Organizational Ambidexterity
When we consider the boundary conditions of organizational ambidexterity, it
is useful to review assumptions underlying the virtue of organizational
ambidexterity. As is discussed below, organizational ambidexterity is leveraged to
address the obstacles or difficulties an organization confronts when both exploitation
and exploration are pursued. In other words, under conditions where such obstacles
and difficulties are circumvented by other (less costly) means, there is no need for
organizations to rely on such costly measures as organizational ambidexterity.
Understanding an organization’s underlying motivation for adopting organizational
ambidexterity provides us with a clue to uncovering the boundary conditions of
organizational ambidexterity.
The first question we need to ask ourselves is why pursuing both exploitation
and exploration is necessary. In other words, why can organizations not just rely on
a single mode of organizational learning? According to March (1991), an
appropriate balance between exploitation and exploration is necessary for the
purpose of an organization’s “system survival and prosperity” (p.71). When a firm
only exploits, its adaptation is limited to local adjustments. However, excessively
exploring new possibilities threatens a firm’s survival. A firm needs to explore new
knowledge because a firm should flexibly keep adapting to the continuously (and
sometimes drastically) changing needs of customers and markets. However, such
flexible adaptation is only possible when the day-to-day stability of routine
operation is maintained.5) It may sound paradoxical, but a flexibly changing firm
needs to maintain the reliability and accountability of its daily business operations as
far as possible, which requires exploiting existing knowledge and technology to the
fullest extent.
A choice between exploitation and exploration is generally understood as a
choice between “current viability” and “future viability” (Levinthal & March, 1993:
105). However, in addition to the fact that exploitation and exploration supplement
each other by occupying different learning time-frames, it is important to note that
there is a more direct complementary relationship between exploitation and
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5 ) For example, Auh & Menguc (2005) argue that although intense competition calls for
exploration, it “does not necessarily suggest that greater exploration is the universally preferred
option under conditions of intense competition. A critical point is that the consequences of
exploration are distal and uncertain. At least in the short-term, firms will also need to engage in
exploitative learning to respond to and counter competitive behavior. Without this balance, firms
run the risk of losing their current position through diverting their resources to exploratory
learning, the benefits of which might or might not materialize. Therefore, exploration needs to
be complemented with exploitation” (p.1654).
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exploration. More specifically, the fruits of exploration cannot be fully realized
without exploitation, and vice versa. For example, organizations need to generate
enough resources by extensively exploiting existing knowledge before they explore
widely enough in order to ensure their adaptation to environmental changes.
Achieving adaptation also requires appropriately exploiting new knowledge gained
through exploration.6) Since exploitation and exploration are often dichotomized as
“mean enhancing (McGrath, 2001)” and “variance increasing” (ibid.), respectively,
one may feel exploitation is unnecessary for realizing an organization’s survival and
prosperity through adaptation to uncertainty in future business environments.
However, expected benefits from exploration (and exploitation) cannot be achieved
unless an organization pursues both exploitation and exploration.
Given the importance of simultaneously pursuing exploitation and exploration,
why do organizations need such a costly measure like organizational ambidexterity?
In other words, why is the simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and exploration so
difficult?
According to Levinthal & March (1993), organizational learning entails two
mechanisms targeted to address complicated interactions among environmental
factors and each organizational member’s simultaneous learning behaviors. The first
mechanism is simplification of experiences by decomposing learning units (and thus
problems and solutions learned) and by enacting environment. The second is the
specialization of adaptation patterns through substituting alternative adaptation
patterns by the one with equivalent effects (ibid.). Although these mechanisms
enable organizations to learn easily, they at the same time cause three types of
myopia or overlooking. Namely, as organizations learn, they overlook distant times,
distant places, and failures. Consequently, a delicate balance between exploitation
and exploration is disturbed, and organizations are forced to pursue either
exploitation or exploration, but not both.
Accordingly, Levinthal & March (1993) argue that it is necessary for
organizations to choose to focus on either exploitation or exploration. Otherwise, it
is very difficult to overcome complicated interactions so that they can be more
adaptive. In other words, recognizing a complicated experience as it is, or
diversifying adaptation patterns goes against an organization’s inherent nature.
Organizations are generally characterized as avoiding the risks (or uncertainty)
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6 ) For example, Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda (2005 b) state that “exploratory innovations
help units to encounter rapid obsolescence of products and services. However, without rapid
exploitation of the results from exploration, competitors are able to imitate a unit’s exploration
efforts and introduce an improved version more efficiently and at lower cost. In this way, units
waste time and resources to exploratory innovation without enhancing efficiency and generating
income through exploitative innovation” (p.353).
Osamu SUZUKI??
associated with exploration. Therefore, although both exploitation and exploration
are required for long-term organizational adaptation, organizations either overexploit
at the risk of losing major change opportunities (Levitt & March, 1988), or
overexplore by not maximizing an innovation’s potential for increasing efficiency
(Anderson & Tushman, 2001).
The difficulty associated with simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and
exploration is exacerbated by available resource constraints. Whether it is money,
time, effort, or simply attention, organizational resources are limited. This is
basically why one of a manager’s most important jobs is to make decisions on
resources allocation. One straightforward implication of the limitation of
organizational resources is that some initiatives are selected for resource allocation,
while others are abandoned. The more an organization is constrained for resources,
the more difficult it is to allocate sufficient resources to exploitative as well as
exploratory initiatives.
Even when enough resources are available, managerial cognition may prevent
managers’ pursuing both exploitation and exploration. From a cognitive perspective,
the difficulty can be explained in that it is difficult for managers to perceive both
exploitative and exploratory opportunity at the same time. Scholars have indicated
that as an organization exploits its existing knowledge through local search, its
subsequent exploratory innovation performance is negatively affected (Cyert &
March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; March, 1991; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). Those
authors provide several reasons in support of this argument. From a behavioral
perspective, it is explained that organizations are trapped at a local peak as a result
of local search (Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal, 1997). As managers focus
excessively on local refinements, they lose sight of the global peak. The
fundamental assumption for this argument is that exploitation requires distinctively
different cognitive patterns from exploration (Anderson & Tushman, 2001).
Another way to understand the difficulty of simultaneous exploitation and
exploration is that exploration of new knowledge is fundamentally at odds with the
raison d’être of an organization (Suzuki, 2010).7) An organization is a device for
coordinating diverse resources contributed by individual organizational members
(Coase, 1937). This coordination is possible because a set of operational standards is
explicitly defined as organizational routines, which exploit known behaviors,
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7 ) Note that this perspective is based on a quite different understanding of the nature of the
organization from that of the knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995). The fact that organizational learning and the knowledge-based view are two
closely related disciplines, but adopt such distinctive viewpoints may show an organization is
ambidextrous by its nature, and that relative balance between exploitation and exploration
changes upon contextual requirements.
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customs, and knowledge.8) With the help of organizational routines, employees are
able to cooperate without extensive negotiations or enforcement measures (March &
Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Another reason organizations are built with
a bundle of organizational routines is that routines are manifestations of
organizational capability (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982;
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Any task that can be skillfully executed without
managers’ deliberate choice is called organizational capability. Thus, organizational
capability is maintained, and enacted as organizational routines. Competitive
organizations maintain their competitiveness because employees intentionally or
unintentionally maintain various organizational routines.
Structural and institutional factors gradually strengthen such predominance of
exploitation (Suzuki, 2010). The explanation from a structural or institutional
perspective is that there is an increasingly tighter coupling among “choices with
respect to activities, policies and organizational structures, capabilities, and
resources” (Siggelkow, 2001). More specifically, continuous exploitation of existing
knowledge results in increasingly tight coupling among a firm’s structure, cognition,
resource allocation, rewards, culture, competences, as well as in the demography of
the senior team, which favors internally consistent changes over exploratory ones
(Adler et al., 2009; Bettis & Prahallad, 1995). In addition, stakeholders also prefer
this tighter coupling for its reliability and accountability. They then select those
organizations with tighter coupling over less tightly coupled competitors. As a
result, organizations suffer structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The
preference of external stakeholders strongly influences an organization’s choice
because these stakeholders provide resources indispensable for maintaining regular
business operations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Sometimes the stakeholders’
influence forces firms to abandon seemingly attractive and promising business
opportunities (Christensen & Bower, 1996).
IV. Boundary Conditions of Organizational Ambidexterity
In this section, we develop propositions on boundary conditions under which
??????????????????????????????????????????
8 ) More recent works propose to reconceptualize organizational routines as a source of
organizational adaptation, rather than a constraint for changes (Feldman & Pentland, 2003;
Rerup & Feldman, 2011). We acknowledge these developments, but we also feel not all
organizational routines are precursors of organizational changes. More precisely, organizational
routines are enacted so that organizational changes are facilitated at some organizations, but not
at other organizations. Organizational routines per se function to retain and repeat standardized
behaviors, and consequently to reduce exploration. Some organizations can flexibly revise
standardized behaviors and leverage organizational routines to disseminate those revisions
throughout the organization.
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organizational ambidexterity is expected to be beneficial for firms’ survival and
prosperity. We do so by leveraging the above discussion on the obstacles and
difficulties organizations face when they try to pursue exploitation and exploration.
In case those obstacles and difficulties are circumvented by less costly measures
than organizational ambidexterity, organizational ambidexterity would not be very
useful. Conditions under which those difficulties and obstacles are less problematic
for organizations are also discussed. Through such discussions, we aim to uncover
under what type of contingencies organizational ambidexterity is expected to be
more or less beneficial for organizations. Then, for each boundary condition, we try
to derive a proposition to be empirically tested by future research.
One quite straightforward corollary of Levinthal & March (1993)’s argument
on myopic organizational learning is that if an organization can learn without
simplifying its experiences or specializing its adaptive response patterns,
simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and exploration should not be too difficult.
Since no manager’s rationality is unbounded (Cyert & March, 1963; March &
Simon, 1958), complete exclusion of simplification and specialization is not feasible.
However, there may be a difference in the degree of simplification and
specialization among different organizations. In case some organizations are capable
of learning with less simplification and specialization than their competitors, those
organizations benefit less from being ambidextrous to the extent that those
organizations are free from learning myopia.
One such example is organizations characterized by extensive market
intelligence activities and cross-department collaborations. Such a combination of
characteristics is called “market orientation” (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Kohli &
Jaworski, 1990),9) and those organizations characterized by higher market orientation
are found to pursue both exploitative and exploratory marketing strategies in a more
financially successful way than their less market oriented competitors
(Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004).10) At organizations characterized by stronger
market orientation, experiences are less simplified because diverse information on
(current as well as future) customers’ needs and preferences (including both direct
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9 ) According to Kohli & Jaworski (1990) “market orientation is the organizationwide generation of
market intelligence pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the
intelligence across departments, and organizationwide responsiveness to it (6).”
10) Kyriakopoulos & Moorman (2004) hypothesize that market orientation is an antecedent for
organizational ambidexterity in that market orientation promotes synergies between exploitative
marketing strategy activities and exploratory marketing strategy activities. On the other hand,
their empirical analysis proves market orientation moderates, rather than enables, the
relationship between organizational ambidexterity and financial performance.
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payers and end customers), competitors, regulators, and technology are vigorously
gathered through extensive market intelligence activities. Such new information,
then, enables continuous review and adjustment of existing norms and procedures
with regard to customer responsiveness. In addition, adaptive patterns are also less
specialized since more frequent cross-departmental collaborations call for
negotiation, bargaining, and concessions among departments with different interests
and specialties. Accordingly, our first proposition on boundary conditions for
organizational ambidexterity is stated as follows.
Proposition 1: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for organizations characterized by less market orientation.
The second boundary condition refers to the situation under which
organizations can survive and prosper either by exploring new knowledge or by
exploiting existing knowledge, but not both. Prior work uncovered that the choice
between exploitation and exploration is dichotomized by the degree of
environmental turbulence (Burns & Stalker, 1961). According to such a contingency
perspective, in case the degree of environmental turbulence is very low,
organizational ambidexterity is not particularly beneficial, since organizations
perform satisfactorily enough by exploiting known strategy (ibid.). In such a
competitive landscape, organizations run the risk of the “failure trap” (Levinthal &
March, 1993, p.105−106) when they uselessly explore new strategies. Conversely, a
highly turbulent competitive environment requires organizations to be mostly
exploratory, rather than ambidextrous (ibid.). In a highly turbulent competitive
environment, new strategy, technology, or customers are continuously explored,
since a competitive situation changes too quickly for organizations to fully exploit
known competence (D’aventi, 1994). Accordingly, organizational ambidexterity
should be beneficial only when the degree of environmental turbulence is neither
low nor high, but moderate.
Although some authors argue organizations are more likely to be ambidextrous
under a dynamic environment (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005 b), they
do not test whether those ambidextrous organizations are more successful by being
ambidextrous. The same set of authors also study firms’ financial performance under
a dynamic environment. They show the association with firm performance is
positive for exploratory innovation but negative for exploitative innovation (Jansen,
Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006), implying organizational ambidexterity under a
turbulent (or dynamic) competitive environment is not particularly beneficial.
Proposition 2: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
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for organizations competing under a moderately turbulent environment than for
organizations under either low or high environmental turbulence.
In addition to the degree of environmental turbulence, organizational size is an
important boundary condition of organizational ambidexterity. This is because,
relatively speaking, a larger organization is less constrained by the amount of
available resources. Thanks to more available resources, larger organizations suffer
less from an either-or choice between exploitation and exploration. On the other
hand, smaller organizations benefit significantly from being ambidextrous. They are
always faced with the difficulty of allocating limited resources to both exploitative
and exploratory initiatives. Organizational ambidexterity, contextual ambidexterity in
particular, eases this difficulty by enabling smaller organizations to better facilitate
cognitive as well as behavioral readiness for such difficulties among organizational
members. Accordingly, we state our third proposition as follows.
Proposition 3: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for smaller organizations.
Even when an organization is small in terms of its absolute size, slack
resources (March & Simon, 1958) may enable smaller firms to pursue both
exploration and exploitation. Slack resources are the type of resources that can be
redeployed for alternative use without significant interruption of current business
operation. For example, short-term investment in marketable securities is a typical
slack resource. Given that constraints of available resources are one of the major
impediments to simultaneously pursuing exploitation and exploration, slack
resources should ease managers’ challenge with regard to pursuing exploitation and
exploration simultaneously, and thus the need to be ambidextrous. Therefore, even
among organizations of roughly the same size, the expected benefits of
organizational ambidexterity may differ depending on the amount of slack resources.
Proposition 4: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for organizations with less slack resources.
Given that managerial cognition strongly affects an organization’s choice
between exploitation and exploration, any conditions that influence managerial
cognition should be considered as an important boundary condition of organizational
ambidexterity. A degree of risk tolerance is one such condition. Contrary to the
general expectation that an organization behaves in a risk-averse manner (i.e., with
low risk tolerance), in the case when a future prospect is perceived from the domain
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of losses, an organization behaves in a risk-seeking manner (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). With such increased risk tolerance, managers are expected to be less reluctant
to recognize and pursue exploratory initiatives. For example, managers who have
just experienced a substantial financial loss would feel more willing to pursue
exploratory initiatives since there are some (albeit very small) possibilities of big
future gains. Consequently, under the situation where managers evaluate their future
prospect from the domain of losses, organizational ambidexterity is less beneficial
compared to the situation where managers are in the domain of gains.
Proposition 5 a: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for organizations more strongly characterized by the domain of gains.
Managerial cognition, as well as managers’ resultant behaviors, is also
influenced by the amount of organizational slack. More specifically, as the amount
of slack resources increases, an organization behaves in a more risk-seeking manner.
This argument brings us to the same conclusion as the one we discussed above on
organizational slack. However, the underlying reasoning is different. We argued that
with more organizational slack, organizations are more exploratory since available
resource constraints can be alleviated. In addition to that, organizations with more
organizational slack pursue more exploratory initiatives because managers’ risk
tolerance is increased (Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Singh, 1986). Managers are more
willing to explore risky initiatives because organizational slack resolves latent goal
conflict between political coalitions in organizations and thus prevents them from
being too critical and selective (Cyert & March, 1963). It may also be that
organizational slack allows managers to pursue enough exploitative initiatives whose
future financial gains compensate for expected negative returns from exploratory
initiatives. Whatever the underlying explanation, organizations with more
organizational slack behave in a more risk-seeking manner, and thus benefit less
from organizational ambidexterity.
Proposition 5 b: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for organizations with less slack resources.
Given that organizational routines are an obstacle for simultaneous exploitation
and exploration, organizations with relatively few organizational routines should
benefit less from organizational ambidexterity. Accordingly, organizational age is
also an important boundary condition for organizational ambidexterity. Specifically,
younger organizations are generally free from a thick accumulation of organizational
routines, whereas older organizations rely on an interrelated web of organizational
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routines for their reliable and efficient operation. For example, So/ rensen & Stuart
(2000) show that older organizations customarily rely on recombining their internal
knowledge, rather than exploring external new-to-the-firm knowledge. Consequently,
we argue that younger organizations benefit less from being ambidextrous, since
they are less constrained by organizational routines when they try to search across
broader fields of new knowledge. In contrast, organizational ambidexterity is
particularly beneficial for larger organizations, since without organizational
ambidexterity, exploratory initiatives are crowded out as familiar knowledge is
exploited though enactment of organizational routines (Benner & Tushman, 2002,
2003).
Proposition 6: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for older organizations.
Finally, in a situation where the degree of institutionalization is relatively
limited, organizational ambidexterity is expected to be less useful. This is because
an organization is less constrained by stakeholders’ (suppliers, customers, or
regulators) expectations regarding reliable and accountable business operations under
such a business context. Consequently, even barely ambidextrous organizations can
pursue exploratory initiatives (and exploitative initiatives) without fear of damaging
the relationship with stakeholders. According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), the
degree of institutionalization tends to be higher under some conditions than others.
Such conditions include substantial interventions by regulators, high perceived
uncertainty regarding appropriate competitive behaviors, and a predominance of
highly specialized functional professionals. In other words, in business contexts
characterized by limited regulators’ interventions, low perceived uncertainty
regarding appropriate competitive behaviors, and limited roles for highly specialized
functional professionals, it is expected that organizations can exploit and explore
even without organizational ambidexterity.
Proposition 7 a: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for organizations competing under more frequent and substantial regulators’
interventions.
Proposition 7 b: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
for organizations characterized by higher perceived uncertainty regarding
appropriate competitive behaviors.
Proposition 7 c: Organizational ambidexterity is expected to be more beneficial
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for organizations where highly specialized functional professionals play more
substantial roles.
V. Discussion
Any managerial approach is dependent on contextual factors for its expected
benefits. In other words, no managerial theory is universally valid irrespective of the
contexts to which the theory is applied. In this manuscript, we try to uncover
boundary conditions of an increasingly popular managerial concept, i.e.,
organizational ambidexterity. Science develops by first identifying a new concept’s
benefits, that of seeing the world in a new way; then, by appreciating both the
benefits and costs of the new concept (Rerup, 2005). We hope this manuscript
contributes toward a more nuanced understanding of organizational ambidexterity.
By synthesizing prior works on organizational ambidexterity, as well as other
related disciplines including organizational learning, managerial cognition, risk
preference, resource dependence, as well as institutionalization, we derived ten
propositions on the boundary conditions of organizational ambidexterity. These
propositions suggest that though organizational ambidexterity is likely to be
associated with business survival and prosperity in most cases, under certain
conditions it may not be critical. An ambidextrous organization requires a
substantial commitment of resources and managerial efforts. Organizational
ambidexterity is useful only if the benefits it affords exceed the costs of those
resources and efforts. Particularly, managers of businesses falling outside of these
boundary conditions should pay close attention to a cost-benefit comparison of
organizational ambidexterity.
We conclude this manuscript by discussing our findings’ implications for future
research agendas. First, uncovering the boundary conditions of organizational
ambidexterity enables us to better explain why and how organizational
ambidexterity is beneficial. Understanding boundary conditions entails understanding
what types of obstacles or difficulties are resolved by being ambidextrous. Such
understanding allows us to discern a mechanism by which ambidextrous
organizations more effectively achieve survival and prosperity than their less
ambidextrous competitors.
Our findings also inform continuing research on the antecedents of
organizational ambidexterity. A better understanding of the boundary conditions of
organizational ambidexterity enables us to uncover how organizations may be
managed to be more effectively ambidextrous. For example, smaller organizations
are advised to choose contextual ambidexterity when they try to be ambidextrous.
On the other hand, larger organizations would benefit more by selecting temporal
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ambidexterity.
Future research can build on our work by empirically testing interaction effects
between those boundary conditions and organizational ambidexterity. Identifying
which boundary conditions are more or less influential than others is another fruitful
avenue for a practical inquiry, while uncovering reasons for the differing influences
addresses theoretical interests. Some boundary conditions may be complementary to
others, whereas others are mutually exclusive.
On a more theoretical front, our work contributes to the continuing efforts to
clarify the relationship between organizational ambidexterity and dynamic
capabilities. Uncovering the contingent nature of organizational ambidexterity, we
contend that organizational ambidexterity supports organizations as dynamic
capabilities under some conditions discussed in this manuscript. Gaining new
organizational capabilities entails learning to do new tasks (or to execute existing
tasks in a new way). Such learning requires recombining both existing and new
knowledge. Accordingly, under the conditions uncovered in this manuscript,
ambidextrous organizations can “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and
external competences” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, p.2011) by simultaneously
exploiting existing knowledge and exploring new knowledge. Consequently, we feel
it appropriate to define organizational ambidexterity as one type of manifestation of
dynamic capabilities, rather than an antecedent of dynamic capabilities. On the other
hand, it seems to be very difficult to specify a causal relationship between
organizational ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities, since dynamic capabilities
may or may not precede organizational ambidexterity. The consequence of
integrating, building, and reconfiguring internal and external competence may be
exploratory, exploitative, or both. Another difficulty associated with specifying an
antecedent-consequence relationship is discerning a hierarchy of organizational
capabilities. Are dynamic capabilities located higher than organizational
ambidexterity, or vice versa? It seems plausible to assume the existence of such a
hierarchy, but clearly defining it is beyond the scope of our manuscript.
Research on organizational ambidexterity entails a promise to solve one of the
central issues of organizational learning proposed by March (1991). Since then,
many scholars have tried to explain how some organizations reconcile exploitation
and exploration more effectively than others. However, our current understanding of
organizational ambidexterity is still limited, confused, and sometimes imprecise. We
hope the boundary conditions uncovered by our manuscript contribute to advancing
this important discipline to a next developmental stage.
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